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Abstract 
 
The influence of political parties on governance reforms such as anti-corruption is 
understudied. Studies usually focus on the performance of civil service and the central 
government. But political parties are the ones who deliver and can be held 
accountable by the electorate who voted for them. This study in particular focuses on 
various categories of political parties in Ukraine, establishing the criteria for 
Europeanized, anti-corruption and institutionalized parties. Later on, it focuses on a 
statistical analysis of how these parties influence one of the main governance reforms 
in Ukraine – the public procurement reform. After collecting the relevant data on 
public procurement of 460 municipalities of Ukraine, the quantitative analysis 
establishes a link between the public procurement and pro-European, anti-corruption 
and institutionalized parties in Ukraine. Findings of this research contribute to the 
literature of anti-corruption parties and the impact of political parties on governance 
reforms in general.  	  	  
Key words: anti-corruption, Europeanization, political parties, public procurement, 
post-Euromaidan, Ukraine. 
 
 
 
“Don’t steal 50%, steal 5% - show some conscience”, Ex Prime Minister of Ukraine 
in a public speech to the Cabinet of Ministers, 2010 
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1.	  Introduction	  and	  Research	  Problem	  	  
To steal or not to steal? According to Ukrainian Ex Prime Minister Mr Azarov (now an 
international criminal persecuted by Interpol for misappropriation and embezzlement), stealing 
Ukrainian public funds was acceptable as long as officials stole 5% as opposed to 50% because 
the latter amount could be tracked down (Kupatadze 2015). This is one of the examples of how 
highly acceptable corruption was in Ukrainian top governance. It also demonstrates the need to 
research and track corruption down, even if it is 5 instead of 50% as the Ex Prime Minister 
suggested to be acceptable. For the purpose of this research, corruption is framed as 
embezzlement/misuse of public funds to the detriment of the interest of the citizens, usually 
defined as political corruption (see for example Philip 1997 and Philip 2015, as cited in 
Rothstein and Varraich 2017). 
Throughout the history of the Eastern European states, corruption was and remains to be 
one of the main challenges that its societies face (Transparency International 2015, 2016). Due 
to the particularities of Soviet history and post communist regimes, states found themselves 
with a challenging heritage that created ways for the proliferation and flourishing of corruption. 
Corruption is considered as a major threat to societies all around the globe: it excludes citizens 
from enjoying the benefits of economic development, and also undermines their political and 
social liberties. It complicates doing business in countries or engaging in mutually beneficial 
economic or social partnerships. Furthermore, any type of international cooperation and transfer 
of funds can be endangered in corrupted environments. 
Some of the Eastern European countries identify corruption and ways to combat it in a 
more efficient way than others. However, some of them keep fighting against corruption and 
aim to learn the lessons from their neighbors.	  Currently, Lithuania, Estonia, Latvia and Georgia 
rank higher in corruption perception indexes than Armenia, Azerbaijan, Moldova, Ukraine and 
Russia. In the cases of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia there has been a drastic increase of anti-
corruption promotion along with the negotiations of EU membership and post-accession. But 
when it comes to the Eastern Partnership countries, which lack prospects of becoming members 
of the EU, there is a big difference in corruption, most notably in the cases of Georgia and 
Ukraine. Georgia ranks 48th in the Corruption Perception Index while Ukraine ranks 130th. 
Georgia developed anti-corruption measures in a more efficient way than Ukraine did, while not 
having a prospect of EU membership like the Baltic States did. In the initial stage of research of 
corruption in post-Soviet states I focused on Georgia and Ukraine given that their cooperation 
with the EU is similar, therefore EU conditionality is similar, but the outcomes of corruption are 
different. This phenomenon raised many questions with regards to what factors and actors shape 
the success of fighting corruption in Post-Soviet states. After conducting a first comparison of 
anti-corruption institutional frameworks of both countries, I reached the conclusion that 
political will is what determines the difference in anti-corruption success in the two cases 
(Onopriychuk 2017). 
As demonstrated in the cases of Ukraine and Georgia in my previous research, 
international and EU conditionality - even if almost identical - can have different outcomes on 
the democratization processes in different states. However, in addition to the EU conditionality 
Georgia also implemented centralization of political power and political will in the hands of the 
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ex President and his Government post Rose Revolution. Thus, political will is believed to be the 
main reason why anti-corruption reforms succeeded in Georgia and brought it from 130th most 
corrupt country in the world to 43rd in the ranking, at the same level as some of the European 
Union states. Nonetheless, Ukraine and its international partners promote decentralization of 
anti-corruption reforms in Ukraine, a very different approach to what happened in Georgia.  
In order to research whether decentralization is an effective strategy to combat 
corruption and the effect of political will of political parties on its development, I analyze the 
impact of political representation of municipal councils on the actual implementation of public 
procurement reform (open tenders) in all of the municipalities in Ukraine. The representation of 
political parties at the regional (municipal) level will help to identify the level of political will 
that these parties have to implement anti-corruption reforms when compared to the data on 
public procurement procedures and the promises that parties made in the election strategies.  
Why public procurement reforms? Public procurement allows for analysis of corruption 
and anti-corruption in a country. Due to the size of the financial flows, the proximity between 
public-private sector and complexity of the procedures, public procurement is most vulnerable 
to fraud and corruption (OSCE 2016). While it is such an important topic of research, empirical 
investigation of the public procurement in Ukraine has been impossible until now due to lack of 
data on the tenders, their solicitors, participants, and details of established contracts. With the 
establishment of Prozorro public procurement reform data is now easily available for anyone 
who is willing to hold public institutions accountable (BI Prozorro 2017). However, even if the 
data is publicly available, it is still difficult to distinguish between inefficient (unprofessional) 
and corrupted procedures.  
In order to identify political interests in anti-corruption, this research also focuses on the 
representation and the electoral strategies of political parties across the municipalities in 
Ukraine. Political parties in Eastern Europe are a topic of particular concern among scholars. It 
is often argued that the political parties in this region are volatile (Powel and Tucker 2009). 
Moreover, in Eastern Europe there are new parties that emerge quite easily due to lack of party 
institutionalization and the discontent of the electorate with the existing parties (Tavits 2007). 
Particularly in Ukraine, even after 25 years of independence from the Soviet Union there are no 
solid and professional political parties due to weak ideology and policies, corruption, 
fragmentation, lack of accountability to voters and financial concerns among other issues 
(Kuzio 2014).  
In general, political parties receive little attention when it comes to debates on how to 
improve the quality of governance - when it comes to increasing governance effectiveness and 
reducing corruption, the focus is usually on central government and public sector institutions 
(Keefer 2015; 242). However, considering that so many international stakeholders put their 
hope into the effects of the decentralization, one would assume that local politics offer a new 
prospect of implementation of anti-corruption reforms at the regional level. Political parties can 
play a role in the decentralization of Ukrainian governance and the fight against corruption due 
to their representation in the decision-making of the regions. Nevertheless, their impact on anti-
corruption reforms has not been studied yet. This research aims to analyze it with the data from 
Prozorro public procurement system. The research question is:  
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Do political parties have an impact on the implementation of anti-corruption 
reforms at the municipal level in Ukraine? 
By answering this research question, the study aims to contribute to the limited existing 
literature on the role of political parties for governance reforms in general and in post-Soviet 
states in particular. It is, in fact, the first study to analyze the influence of post-Euromaidan 
political parties of Ukraine on one of the main anti-corruption reforms. In order to understand 
the logic behind the research question, I will first introduce the relevant theory and hypothesis 
of this study and then proceed with the discussion of the particular sub-topics of the research 
such as: corruption in Ukraine, decentralization of regional governance, evolution of political 
parties in Ukraine, grand corruption in public procurement and the Prozorro public procurement 
reform. After this, the analysis of the results will present the statistical findings and will 
culminate with a discussion of the findings of this study.  
2.	  Theory	  and	  Hypotheses	  
2.1.	  Salience	  of	  anti-­‐corruption	  rhetoric	  in	  political	  parties	  
Political parties in Eastern Europe have been for long considered as corrupt entities. 
Over a decade ago scholars like Grzymala-Busse (2003) argued that post-communist parties 
tend to look for private benefits and continue to draw material resources from the state. This can 
be partly explained with the lack of oversight mechanisms that post-communist states didn’t 
have a chance to establish (Grzymala-Busse 2006). While trying to overcome the post-
communist legacies, some states have succeeded in establishing effective oversight mechanisms 
to reduce the misappropriation of public funds. Yet, some other states like Ukraine did not have 
the same success and keep trying to find the ways to combat corruption. Political parties play a 
very important role in this process since they can introduce barriers to rent seeking and establish 
an effective way to monitor the distribution and spending of state resources (Grzymala-Busse 
2006). However, they can do so if they think that electoral benefit from supporting the reform is 
higher than the benefit of corruption. 
In the case of this research, political parties are expected to promote the anti-corruption 
reforms in the context of open public procurement. But why would political parties want to 
promote anti-corruption and more specifically open public procurement? Grzymala-Busse 
(2006; 15) argued that adoption of formal monitoring and oversight institutions happens when a 
robust competition of parties exists. According to this theory, when parties fear competition 
they aim to constrain the options to access and profit from state resources so that the other 
parties don’t benefit from it. In addition to this, when a robust competition of political parties 
exists, the governing parties will increase the formal constrains to rent seeking activities 
(Grzymala-Busse 2006; 15).  
In addition to this, scholars argue that understanding the salience of political corruption 
is important because anti-corruption transformed the political competition in Eastern and 
Western Europe (Polk et al 2017). They have found that newer parties tend to emphasize 
fighting corruption more than established ones because they can present themselves as clean in 
vis-à-vis the established (older) political parties that have proved themselves to be corrupt. The 
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idea behind this assumption is that electorate is tired of old corrupted parties and will follow the 
ideas of the fresh newcomers to the political landscape. What is more, Polk et al argue that 
populist left-wing and populist right-wing parties will stress the anti-corruption rhetoric more 
than parties with other ideologies (Polk et al 2014; 2). While this finding seems to apply in the 
European states, it might not be applicable in the case of this research because the governance, 
the culture and the history of the European and post-communist states differ1.  
2.2.	  The	  impact	  of	  institutionalized,	  Europeanized	  and	  anti-­‐corruption	  parties	  on	  
public	  procurement	  	  
2.2.1.	  Institutionalization	  of	  political	  parties	  
In order to consider why some parties promote anti-corruption reforms more than others 
I decided to focus on three theories in this analysis that fit the framework of Ukrainian politics. 
The first one is the theory of institutionalized/pragmatic parties. According to Keefer, political 
parties that are more institutionalized (older parties) limit the abilities of individual party 
members and leaders to be corrupt and harm the whole party membership (Keefer 2015; 229). 
This theory argues that the age of the parties affects their reputation and allows parties to 
discipline their members. As Keefer argues, parties that are more institutionalized (older 
parties) discipline their members who deviate from party line and thus reduce corrupted 
initiatives (Keefer 2015; 231). This research will test whether this also applies in Ukraine. 
Indeed, after the fall of the Soviet Union political parties did not succeed in 
institutionalizing themselves. This was due to poor party infrastructure, unclear ideological 
foundations and political agendas that were led by self-interest of party members 
(Mierzejewski-Voznyak 2013). Furthermore, some of the parties in Ukraine (like Yuliya 
Tymoshenko party, Party of Regions and Our Ukraine – Self Defense block) were sponsored 
and governed by oligarchs who dictated their interests from Kiev to the regions (Mierzejewski-
Voznyak 2013, 97). Institutionalization of political parties was also complicated by the political 
instability and constant change of party membership according to the individual interests. In 
fact, 71% of Ukrainian citizens believe that new parties are less corrupt than older parties 
(Razumkov 2015; 104). But this is an assumption that has to be tested in this research. 
2.2.2.	  Europeanization	  of	  political	  parties	  
Another political strategy that is relevant for the political parties in Eastern European 
states is establishing a link between their party and the EU. The so-called “Europeanization” of 
political parties is considered to be another example of party success in winning electoral votes. 
Citizens consider the EU as the ultimate standard for democratic values – this is why they tend 
to support parties that promote Europeanization of post-communist regimes. Scholars argue that 
“Europeanization” is a legitimation strategy of political parties in countries like Georgia and 
Ukraine (Cianciara 2016). Following this theory, EU conditionality plays a very important role 
because by approximating themselves to the EU, the parties (and the governments) have to 
adopt the EU rules, norms and procedures in exchange of benefits such as visa liberalization or 
trade agreements.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  Polk et al (2017) argue that the salience of anti-corruption also depends on the quality of governance of states.	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Parties have to convince the government to adhere to the guidelines that the EU provides 
in exchange for benefits like trade agreements of free visa travels (which happened both in 
Ukraine and Georgia). Even though studies of EU conditionality have usually focused on pre-
accession conditionality (Grabbe 2006), the relevance of this phenomenon goes beyond the 
borders of the EU (Freyburg et al 2015). In the case of Ukraine, the EU conditionality objective 
number one is to combat corruption and establish anti-corruption mechanisms. 
Moreover, studies that have already analyzed the correlation between the EU position 
and anti-elite rhetoric found that political parties in Europe that are pro-European (measured by 
their position on European integration) are less likely to emphasize anti-elite rhetoric (Polk et al 
2017; 9). Once again, the findings for European states seem to deviate with the case of Ukraine, 
where parties that are pro-European are expected to have a higher level or rhetoric on anti-
corruption. 
2.2.3.	  Anti-­‐corruption	  parties	  
In line with the previous theory, anti-corruption is one of the main requirements of the 
EU conditionality. Hence, the anti-corruption parties theory is also relevant for this study. 
Bagenholm (2013) and Bagenholm and Charron (2015) defined anti-corruption parties as the 
ones that focus on the fight against corruption in their election campaign. This phenomenon is 
named as “anti-corruption parties”2, which is a renowned successful electoral strategy (Charron 
and Bagenholm 2014, 2015). While it is argued that established parties have increased their 
support by politicizing corruption there is not much analysis on why corruption is politicized 
and why anti-corruption parties emerge (Charron and Bagenholm 2015, 267). 
Ukrainian history made it necessary for political parties to focus on anti-corruption 
during their campaigns in order to win electoral votes. Mainly, due to the fact that political 
parties proved that they are corrupt entities. But some put more emphasis on anti-corruption 
than others. In other words, in Ukraine politicians make careers by promoting anti-corruption. 
Research of anti-corruption parties is limited. In the previous studies, the political salience of 
anti-corruption was analyzed from the voting support perspective (Engler 2015, Klašnja et al 
2014). Nonetheless, it was studied in the context of Central and Western European states. 
Therefore, studying it from the perspective of a post-Soviet states brings a new insight to the 
literature.  
2.2.4.	  How	  could	  institutionalized,	  Europeanized	  and	  anti-­‐corruption	  political	  parties	  affect	  
the	  tender	  procedures?	  
In the context of Ukraine, individual deputies from a variety of political parties compose 
municipal councils. They are in charge of multiple tasks that involve management and 
allocation of state funds and state property in their municipality. What they could and should do 
in terms on public procurement reform is to create incentives to monitor the full implementation 
of this reform in their municipality. Moreover, they can introduce legal provisions in their 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2	  In addition to the concept of anti-corruption parties, the most common example of literature on salience of anti-
corruption rhetoric frames it in the concept of politicization. This concept was avoided in this study due to the fact 
that politicization refers to both salience and conflict of interests for example for party survival. Since the conflict 
of interests and party survival is not included in this analysis, only salience of corruption is discussed. 
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region that will force the different departments and committees of a specific municipal council 
to publish all of the public tenders online, independently of the amount of state funds involved. 
According to the above-mentioned theories, parties would do so due to existing competition as 
well as to comply with the EU conditionality standards.  
In addition to that, politicians should be accountable to their principals (the voters) and 
deliver on the promises that they made during the electoral campaign. What can complicate this 
is the fact that politicians do not control the public tenders procedures themselves – it is up to 
their agents (the bureaucrats) to announce public tenders. While they cannot directly control all 
of the actions of their agents, they can create mechanisms of accountability that aim to decrease 
the potential corruption in public procurement. The same applies for the politicians in Kiev and 
the politicians in the municipal councils: the politicians in Kiev should ensure that they approve 
national laws on public procurement and regional accountability. Since the Prozorro platform 
already exists, politicians do not have to invent new accountability mechanisms but promote the 
use of existing ones. 
With regards to literature on public procurement, there are examples of data analysis 
where public data on tenders in Hungary was analyzed (Fazekas and Tóth 2016). But the link 
between political parties and public procurement is not present in the scholarly discourse. In 
fact, there has been no specific mention to the influence of political parties on bidding 
procedures in Eastern European states. This can be due to the fact that data is not easily 
available because of inefficiency of public procurement systems. That is why there is a need to 
study this particular field in the region.  
Therefore, in line with the theories in this section, political parties are expected to have 
three strategies that will potentiate the salience of anti-corruption. Institutionalized parties are 
expected to have more control over its party members and thus be more open to anti-corruption 
incentives. Anti-corruption parties are expected to be more open to anti-corruption reforms, and 
therefore hypothetically aim to develop the public procurement reform. Pro-European political 
parties will also be considered to have played a role in promoting public procurement. Having 
said this, the main hypotheses are: 
H1: Municipalities with stronger presence of anti-corruption political parties will have 
more open public procurement. 
H2: Municipalities with stronger presence of older political parties will have more open 
public procurement. 
H3: Municipalities with a stronger presence of pro-European political parties will have 
more open public procurement. 
3.	  Research	  on	  Ukrainian	  context	  
3.1.	  Corruption	  in	  Ukraine	  
Ukraine has long suffered from the effects of corruption in government. As the citation 
in the first page shows, embezzlement and misappropriation of public funds were part of the 
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accepted culture of the Ukrainian governance partly as a consequence of the Soviet legacy. But 
has this changed? The literature on corruption in post-Soviet states argues that the fall of the 
Soviet Union was a unique opportunity for democratic institutional redesign in those countries 
(Malová and Haughton 2002). However, anti-corruption attempts failed in most of the post-
Soviet states (Schmidt 2007, Batory 2012, McAllister and White 2015). Some scholars studied 
the perception of anti-corruption by Ukrainian elites (Grødeland 2010) while arguing that local 
elites preferred to maintain status quo with regards to the implementation of anti-corruption 
strategies. Others studied the difference between Georgia and Ukraine corruption levels 
approached from the perspective of decentralization of states (Nasuti 2016). However, the 
decentralization of anti-corruption reforms from the perspective of public procurement has not 
been studied yet, neither the influence of political parties on this specific reform.  
Therefore, there is a need to study the anti-corruption reforms of Ukraine, because 
Ukraine is struggling with its implementation. The struggle is not only due to the constant 
presence of self-interest in politics, government and the civil service. It is also due to the 
inefficiency of the implementation of anti-corruption reforms that is caused by lack of 
knowledge, experience and practice on how to introduce such dramatic changes to the 
governance of the country (Interview 1). The sphere of public procurement is only one of 
multiple examples of constant struggle against corruption in the country. It has not been studied 
yet due to it novel factor – public procurement in Ukraine was not documented until the 
Prozorro reform was implemented. In terms of this analysis, this is both a benefit and a 
disadvantage – there are no existing methodological or theoretical foundations for this particular 
research that have been established yet.  
Furthermore, anti-corruption is a concept that can be approached from different 
perspectives, from different definitions of corruption and its forms. This research focuses on 
anti-corruption in the field of public spending and therefore, aims to research the effectiveness 
of use of public money. While studies on effectiveness of public procurement tend to be more 
in-depth and focused on analyzing the data of the contracts, their nature, their value among 
other details, this research focuses on a systematic analysis of procurement tenders across the 
municipalities of Ukraine.  
3.2.	  Decentralization	  of	  Regional	  Governance	  in	  Ukraine	  
Scholars praise decentralization by arguing that many of the implementing reforms can 
work at the local level because local authorities are making a bigger effort to become more 
transparent and accountable to their constituents (LaRoque 2016). While decentralization 
reform is not an easy process and the full potential of regional authorities has not been 
implemented yet, it is interesting to research to what extend municipal councils promote 
reforms with the example of public tenders. In this regard, the structure of Ukrainian regional 
governance is a puzzle due to its constant changes. Moreover, considering its Soviet legacy, the 
territorial division of Ukraine is complicated. There are several types of local authorities, 
defined as elected and other bodies of local communities empowered to decide on local issues 
by the constitution. There are 24 regions, called “oblast”, which are the primary administrative 
units. These are unitary units, which do have limited legal capacities. Each region has 10 to 27 
districts (also referred as municipalities in this paper). 
	   13	  
The overview of the hierarchy of the local governance is as follows: 
 
 
Figure 1 – The hierarchy of the Ukrainian governance  
 
The arrows in the previous Figure represent the accountability of one institution to the 
others. The main problem of such a distribution is the lack of coordination that it creates among 
the relevant regional authorities. Therefore, one of the main concerns of the decentralization 
reform in Ukraine is the need to strictly define and delimit the functions of the different regional 
governments. The design of the new decentralization reform increased coordination and 
accountability mechanisms amongst these local governance institutions.  
Considering the complex Ukrainian context, the post-Maidan government decided to 
make decentralization the top priority reform in March 2014. This reform was needed more than 
ever because the previous government centralized the executive and other decision-making 
powers in Kiev to a high extent. This left regional authorities with no freedom to take their own 
decisions and implement their own budgets timely and efficiently. Not only did it affect the 
budget implementation, but it also stalled the general development of the regions with regards 
to basic service delivery such as education, health care, the development of infrastructure and 
social benefits (Hanushchak 2017). Consequently, the concentration of power in Kiev also 
mismanaged the regional capacity and development of the institutions at the local levels. Civil 
servants in the regions were simply not trained and/or lacked knowledge and resources to 
implement all the necessary elements related to their work (Interview 2). This is also why the 
2014 decentralization reform was crucial for developing capacity with regards to public 
procurement that regional public institutions do. 
Hence, the decentralization reform was created to define the responsibilities that 
regional decision-making organs have and therefore is supposed to have a direct impact on the 
number and quality of public procurement procedures that a municipality organizes. While it is 
a work in progress, it is a crucial element to consider in the analysis. Additionally, it is 
Central	  government	  	  Based	  in	  the	  capital:	  Parliament,	  Ministries	  and	  other	  institutions.	  
Municipal	  Councils	  Elected	  Regional	  MPs	  during	  general	  elections.	  Accountable	  to	  the	  Regions.	  	  	  
Local	  State	  Administrations	   	  Appointed	  by	  the	  President.	  Accountable	  to	  the	  Government	  
City	  Councils	   	  Elected	  during	  general	  elections.	  Accountable	  to	  the	  City	  Major	  
Regional	  Councils	  Elected	  Regional	  MPs	  during	  general	  elections.	  Accountable	  to	  Kiev.	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important to acknowledge the recent developments with regards to budget decentralization, the 
reform on amalgamated territorial communities and the new set up of responsibilities of 
municipal councils because this defines how efficiently they (should) spend their money. By 
law, the municipal councils are in charge of many administrative governance functions and also 
have practical implementation powers that involve decision on finance such as: 
- Approval of programs of socio-economic and cultural development of the 
municipality and monitoring its implementation. 
- Approval of district budgets and monitoring its implementation. 
- Distribution of funds transferred from the state budget in form of subsidies, 
subventions between local budgets of the towns and villages of the municipality.  
- Management of the property of state ownership, building and construction. 
- Establishment and liquidation of communal enterprises and institutions.  
These functions are stated in the Law on Territorial Administrative Division of Ukraine 
(1997, last modified in 2017)3 and the Article 143 of the Constitution of Ukraine (also referred 
to in Committee of the Regions 2017). Political parties in the municipal councils have to be 
held accountable for these functions. Thus, public procurement procedures are a mean for them 
to be accountable and also serve as an indication of how open the municipal councils are.   
3.3.	  Political	  Parties	  In	  Ukraine	  
What role do political parties play in the decentralization of Ukrainian governance and 
the fight against corruption? Due to the representation in the decision-making of the regions or 
municipalities, political parties can be the main actors to deliver on anti-corruption promises. In 
order to understand how political parties can impact reforms it is important to consider not only 
the decentralization of governance reform in Ukraine but also the re-organization of the party 
system in Ukraine after the last Euromaidan revolution.  
It is often argued that Ukraine’s parties remain structurally weak in their political 
decentralization approach, absence of internal democracy, disrespect for voters and reliance on 
opaque sources of funding (Kuzio 2014). Furthermore, oligarchs and big businesses sponsored 
all of the parties, which created a close relationship between them as well as conflicts of interest 
(Kuzio 2014). Only in 2016 a partial state financing of political parties was introduced. As a 
result, even though political parties in Ukraine are known for their particular weakness and lack 
of reliability, political influence can have a strong effect on promoting or blocking the anti-
corruption reforms according to the parties’ interests.  
Presuming that there are reasons to worry about the reform commitment at the center of 
Ukrainian politics but not at the local level due to proximity with the electorate (Committee of 
the Regions 2017, OECD 2016), one would expect political parties to promote anti-corruption 
reforms in their municipalities/regions. It is argued that the implementation of the reforms needs 
bargaining due to the absence of an effective ruling coalition or majority that would support 
them in the Parliament (Sasse 2016). Whether this is different at the regional level is a question 
to be answered in this study.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3	  Available online at http://zakon2.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/280/97-%D0%B2%D1%80/page4, accessed last on 21 
June 2017	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In the past, the knowledge on Ukrainian political parties was quite meager due to lack of 
available information. The list of registered political parties was made available only in 2009 
(Fedorenko et al 2016). Nonetheless, political parties have always been the frontrunners of 
democratization attempts in Ukraine. Starting from the Orange Revolution of 2004, up to the 
latest Euromaidan revolution – political parties have been in the center of the events. 
Nevertheless, whether they did so based on their own interests (such as gaining voters) or 
because they really meant to promote the democratization of the country remains unclear. What 
is clear is that both revolutionary events were important for the party system in Ukraine because 
they meant a change of direction of Ukrainian politics.  
Nowadays, despite being volatile and unstable, political parties matter in Ukraine’s 
reforms process. They do not usually promote specific reforms on their own but still remain the 
ultimate power to approve the necessary legislation to conduct such reforms. However, the 
reality is that corruption keeps flourishing while parties keep promising to fight it and yet end 
up not approving the laws that aim to bring reforms to the country’s governance. Inconsistently 
enough with this political reality of Ukraine, political parties did include the fight against 
corruption in all of their political agendas. As it can be seen in Table 1 (continuation), political 
parties did well on promising future anti-corruption reforms to Ukrainian citizens. This use of 
anti-corruption rhetoric is one of the main aspects of current Ukrainian politics.  
Both anti-corruption and Europeanization strategies resulted in an increase of the 
number of political parties across Ukraine. In fact, after Euromaidan the number of political 
parties increased by almost 30%: in 2015 there were 262 registered political parties, and now 
there are 352 (National Registry 2017). Additionally, scholars argue that ideological orientation 
(which is used in most studies on parties in the EU countries) does not matter for Ukrainian 
voters, but that geopolitical orientation (i.e. pro-European, pro-Russian, pro-NATO) does 
(Fedorenko et al 2016). This is why the concept of Europeanization of political parties has been 
selected for considered in this study.  
After the Euromaidan there has been a re-shaping of the Ukrainian party system (see 
Table 1 for details on the new representation of parties). Unfortunately, it this transformation 
was developing in an extreme geo-political and socio-financial context: there was the need to 
restore the functioning of the state, the need to face the threat of Russian aggression and the 
need to face extremely difficult socio-economic conditions (Razumkov 2015). Despite these 
challenges, the de-communization process (that started post-Euromaidan) resulted in the end of 
the Communist parties in Ukraine, and gave the way to new faces in Ukrainian politics. The 
activists of Euromaidan became members of parliament and members of numerous civil society 
organizations. In this way, pro-European parties became the front-runners of the 2014 
presidential and parliamentary elections. Moreover, for the first time in Ukrainian history the 
main competition for the parliamentary elections was among new (not previously elected to 
Parliament) pro-European parties that came to government as a consequence of Euromaidan: 
only the Motherland party of Tymoshenko was in Parliament both in 2012 and 2014 with 5 
times decrease in representation (Fedorenko et al 2016). Figures show that in 2012 there was a 
50%-44% proportion of pro-European / pro-Russian parties but after the elections of 2014 the 
proportion became 80%-17% (Razumkov 2015). 
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Table 1 – Overview of political parties in the parliament and municipalities of Ukraine 
Party Registration 
(Creation) 
Seats in 
Parliament 
(450 deputies) 
Seats in 
municipalities 
(12107 deputies) 
Ideology and political 
affiliation 
Petro Poroshenko 
Solidarity Party 
2000 140 
(33,2%) 
3365 (22,3%) Christian-democrat 
Conservatism 
Liberalism 
Pro-Europeanism 
Motherland Party 1999 20 
(4,7%) 
2521 (16,7%)  Conservatism 
Liberal democracy 
Pro-Europeanism 
Centre-right 
Radical Party of 
Oleh Lyashko 
2010 20 
(4,7%) 
1147 (7,6%) Ukrainian nationalism 
Radicalism 
Left-wing populism 
Agrarianism 
Opposition Block 
Party 
2010 43 (10,2%) 1370  
(9,1%) 
Social-liberalism 
Pro-Russia 
Regionalism 
Euroscepticism 
UKROP Party 2015 0 (4) 770 
 (5,1%) 
Centre-right 
Agrarian Party 2006 (1996) 0 1159 (7,7%) Agrarianism 
Conservative 
Our Country Party 2011 0 (3) 951 (6,3%) Centre 
Freedom Party 1995 (1991) 0 (7) 605 (4%)  Ukrainian nationalism 
Ultranationalism 
 Right-wing populism 
Anti-communism 
Rebirth Party 2004 26 (6,2%) 655 (4,3%)  Developmentalism 
Pro-Europeanism 
Samopomich Party 2012 26 (6,2%) 210  
(1,4%) 
Christian conservatism 
Pro-Europeanism 
Conservatism 
Citizens’ Position 
Party 
 2005 0 218  
(1,4%) 
 Conservatism 
Pro-Europeanism 
Note: Data of political representation available at http://w1.c1.rada.gov.ua/pls/radan_gs09/ns_zal_frack; Two 
political parties that are present in the Parliament are not represented in the top 11 of municipalities (“Citizens’ 
will” and “National Front”). The parties UKROP, Our Country and Freedom have had no seats in the 
parliamentary fraction but some outside the fraction, considered as “other MPs”.  
 
 
Table 1 (continuation) – Europeanization and anti-corruption levels of the parties  
Party European Union 
proximity 
Score Anti-corruption plan  
from party programme 
Score 
Petro Poroshenko 
Solidarity Party 
- 9 mentions to EU  
- 1 section on 
Eurointegration 
High Focused the objective 3.3 on “the 
fight against corruption”, which 
entails 5 short paragraphs - 2 other 
7 
High 
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- 33 “Euro…” mentions of corruption in another 
objectives. One of them specifically 
on public procurement and the need 
for deoligarchization (16 pages 
document). 
Motherland Party - 7 mentions to EU  
 
Moderate Devoted 2nd objective out of 9 for 
fight against corruption with 11short 
paragraphs on corruption. Additional 
mentions on corruption in: a 
paragraph on security and need to 
join NATO, one paragraph in 
objective 3 on victory of the people, 
another one in objective 4, one in 
objective 8 and one in the conclusion. 
Total 15 paragraphs concerning 
corruption (16 pages document). 
15 
High 
Radical Party of Oleh 
Lyashko 
2 mentions to EU  Moderate 1 objective out of 8 with 4 very 
short paragraphs not mentioning 
corruption specifically, but its forms.  
 
4 
Moderate 
Opposition Block 
Party 
0 None 1 out of 11 objectives, with only one 
paragraph.  
 
1 
Low 
UKROP Party 15 mentions of EU 
and  2 “Euro…” 
High Mentioned in point 1.3.1 and 
throughout the document. 22 
paragraphs in total (out of 47 pages 
document) 
22 
High 
Agrarian Party 5 mentions to EU Moderate 3 paragraphs out of 6 pages 
document 
3 
Moderate 
Our Country Party 0 None 2 paragraphs out of 4 pages 
document. 
2 
Low 
Freedom Party - 1 mention to EU 
- 7 mentions to 
“Euro…” 
Moderate 4 paragraphs out of 13 pages 
document. 
4 
Moderate 
Rebirth Party 0 None 1 non significant mention to 
corruption  
1 
Low 
Self-Help Party 0 None 2 mentions to corruption in 5 page 
document 
2 
Low 
Citizens’ Position 
Party 
15 mentions to 
“Euro…” 
High 4 paragraphs on corruption in 6 page 
document. 
4 
Moderate 
Note: the calculations were made from the number of mentions to EU/Euro… and Corrupt/Anti-corruption in the 
electoral strategies of the political parties available on the parties’ websites. Blue color for high-ranking anti-
corruption and Europeanization parties; Light green for regular scores and grey for the lowest score. The 
Europeanized parties were clustered in two (Solidarity, UKROP, Citizens Position, Motherland and Agrarian as 
high Europeanization) for the statistical analysis and the anti-corruption parties kept in three clusters.  
In disagreement with the theories on salience of anti-corruption rhetoric by Grzymala-
Busse (2003; 2006) and the previous findings of Polk et al (2017) the parties with most salience 
of anti-corruption rhetoric are the older ones and the ones who are in power (with exception of 
UKROP), not in the opposition. What is more, these parties are positioned in the centre, and 
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have no relation to left or right wing populism4. Thus, since the theories on anti-elite rhetoric do 
not apply in the case of this research, the theories of institutionalization, Europeanization and 
anti-corruption parties are considered to explain how and why some political parties promote 
anti-corruption rhetoric more than others.  
3.4.	  Grand	  Corruption	  In	  Public	  Procurement	  in	  Ukraine	  
Public procurement procedures bring public officials and businesses closer to each 
other. This creates new risks and opportunities for corruption. Moreover, these transactions 
involve significant amounts of money and thus are very attractive for corrupted individuals 
(OECD 2016; more detailed in Annex). Ukraine’s public procurement sector, in particular, is 
known for being highly associated with grand corruption. It is estimated that every year 50 
billion hryvnas (2 billion dollars) are being lost through closed deals and limited competition 
(Prozorro Slideshare 2017). And yet, the European Bank considers the country a recommended 
model for e-procurement reform for Reconstruction and Development. It also won a prestigious 
World Procurement Award in May 20165 for the implementation of the Prozorro system as well 
as the Open Government Award of the Best 2016 Reform. Prozorro public procurement 
reform’s key objective is to provide the data on public tenders, which facilitates the monitoring 
and strengthening of accountability and transparency of public administration. This reform has 
been implemented at all levels of government in Ukraine, with available online data to monitor 
the government spending around the country. Therefore, this platform gives an opportunity to 
analyze the effectiveness of decentralization at the regional level of Ukraine.  
Why is decentralization important for public procurement reform? Because it can 
narrow the opportunities for corruption when local politicians are more accountable to the 
voters in their region and when the voters of the region control the data on procurement. 
However, decentralization can also lead to greater opportunities and fewer obstacles to 
corruption at the regional level. This can be explained with underdeveloped IT capacity and 
inadequate knowledge on the procedures of public procurement. In fact, this is one of the main 
problems that the Ministry of Economic Development in Ukraine identified – there are 
thousands of citizens involved in public procurement that do not have the right knowledge and 
skills to do it (Interview 1, 2 and 3). 
Additionally, the lack of proper competition generally allows for the award of contracts 
at values higher than the market ones, which can facilitate the extraction of corrupt rents 
(ERCAS 2015). Furthermore, single bidding in public procurement is considered to be one of 
the main indicators of high-level corruption. Scholars have already proven that the numbers of 
single bidding correlate with levels of corruption in the country (ERCAS 2015). Fazekas and 
Toth (2015) argue that taking into account unfair restriction of competition in public 
procurement is important to create a proxy indicator of corruption. The simplest indication for 
this is the presence of single bidder contracts within the public procurement procedures. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  4	  With reference to Solidarity, Motherland parties that rank high on anti-corruption rhetoric but are established 
centre parties and are in power, not in the opposition. The only exception applies to UKROP party that also ranks 
high, but is a very new party with centre-right ideology. More details in the Table 1. 	  5	  According to the information on http://www.open-contracting.org/2016/07/28/prozorro-volunteer-project-led-
nation-wide-procurement-reform-ukraine/ accessed on 10 March 2017	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Therefore, it is crucial to consider these aspects of public procurement while analyzing the data 
on open tenders.  
One thing is clear – keeping track of accountability of public procurement procedures is 
impossible if the data on public procurement is not available to citizens and the organizations 
interested in holding the government accountable for its actions. The Prozorro reform of public 
procurement implements an e-database with access to a number of governmental public 
procurement procedures. This allows for holding public institutions accountable for their 
spending of taxpayers’ money. But there are still many problems that the reform is facing. One 
of the main problems is the lack of political will to implement the reform as well as lack of 
knowledge of its implementation, which will be discussed in the following section. 
3.5.	  Prozorro	  Reform	  –	  challenges	  of	  implementation	  
The institutional framework of public procurement in Ukraine was regulated by paper 
procedures up to 2016. This system increased the opportunities for corruption rents and did not 
allow for public oversight and monitoring. This is why the governmental budget was losing an 
estimated 60 billion of hryvnas (around 2,5 billion dollars) due to a lack of effective 
procurement system (Prozorro Slideshare 2017). Therefore, when Euromaidan brought a 
number of reformist civil servants to the government, public procurement became the number 
one priority in the Ministry of Economic Development of Ukraine. In this way, in 2014 a team 
of reformists and activists designed the idea of implementation of a new e-procurement system 
in Ukraine.  
The public procurement reform faced several problems. First of all, there was a 
significant lack of political and financial support. Politicians were not very eager to create a 
country-wide public procurement reform and some of them tried to delay it. Even if indirect 
political opposition was noticed, there was no direct opposition to the reform because it would 
have implied “political suicide” (Interview 1). However, the most important opposition was 
faced in the economic aspect of the reform. The donors at national and international level were 
not very enthusiastic to provide financial support to Prozorro. A recent Prozorro publication 
(Prozorro Slideshare 2017) informs that the donors (realizing the benefits of this IT system) did 
not want to finance the IT solutions. Furthermore, these donors did not want to sponsor 
solutions that were promoted by activists instead of public authorities, since building a 
procurement system is a responsibility of national authorities (Interview 2). Fortunately enough, 
Transparency International (TI) Ukraine supported the reform with advocacy and created a risk 
factors assessment to the analysis module of Prozorro (Interview 1). Nowadays, this module is 
fully under control of TI Ukraine, who are in charge of developing it and monitoring its 
functioning through a new platform that was created in November 2016 (Prozorro Slideshare 
2017).  
Despite significant advancement of the procurement reform, its decentralization was and 
is complicated due to a lack of proper enforcement (Interview 3). To this date, the Law on 
Public Procurement (2016) applies only to public tenders that exceed the threshold of 200.000 
hryvnas (around 10.000 euros) for goods and 1.5 million hryvnas (50.000 euros) for services 
(Interview 2). Therefore, regional (or any other) state institutions are not obliged to publish 
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tenders that are below these established thresholds unless they take a decision at the regional 
level to do so and pass the necessary regulations for that purpose. In this way, it has been 
noticed that public institutions report a significant number of procedures that are just below 
(e.g. 199.999 hryvnas) the threshold in order to avoid publishing them and be able to establish a 
less competitive procedure (Novoe Vremya 2017). Such procedures are usually signed by a 
direct contract with the bidder, which avoids open tender procedures and eliminates competition 
(meaning it also eliminates possible savings that a cometitive procedure entails). This is one of 
the many examples that serves as a good indication of corruption in the system. 
 With regards to the public procurement in the municipal insitutions, there are two 
problems with the implementation of the reform at the regional level. First, the regional state 
administrations promote reform only when it is in their interest to support the demands of the 
central government in Kiev (i.e. when the regional state administrations’ employees who want a 
higher-level posinion in Kiev). Second, the city majors tend to focus on being re-elected for 
another term, and thus, try to deliver factual results in the city rather than promoting anti-
corruption reforms (Interview 1). This opens a question of what role do regional municipal 
councils play in this regard. According to the Interview 1, municipal councils promote reforms 
when “a party like Samopomich (Self-help) compells them to do so”. This is an intriguing 
statement to be confirmed in the statistical analysis of this study. 
In addition to the technical challenges that public procurement reform implies, there are 
also political challenges involved. As it is discussed during Interview 2, certain politicians are 
very much against public procurement reform because it implies a decrease in corruption 
opportunities for their businesses. In this way, there is no direct opposition to the reform but 
there are numerous attempts of introducing “masked law provisions” that aim to exclude certain 
businesses (services, products etc.) from the application of accountability that Prozorro reform 
entails. Most recently, there was an attempt of introducing such clauses to the Law on Cyber-
security on 13th May 2017 (TI Ukraine 2017) which failed due to a strong opposition from civil 
society. 
Last but not least, public procurement reform in Ukraine is facing inefficiency and lack 
of knowledge on public procurement amongst the users and organizers of public tenders 
(Interview 2, Interview 3). There are 100.000 Ukrainian citizens (civil servants, teachers, 
doctors etc.) who are involved with public tenders (Interview 3). Most of them are not qualified 
for organizing these procedures, which results in bad documentation, inefficient/unfair selection 
of the contracts and as a result an incredible loss of money. This is why Ukraine is currently 
creating a centralized body for procurement and educates citizens on topics relevant to public 
tenders.  
4.	  Research	  Design	  
4.1.	  Case	  selection	  	  
In order to study the success of the reforms of the Ukrainian government I decided to 
focus on the public institutions’ reforms of Ukraine. For his purpose, I chose one of the best 
reforms that have been implemented in post-Euromaidan Ukraine – the reform of public 
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procurement. This is one of the main examples of successful reform that allowed to transition 
from corrupted procurement procedures to an open platform. The Prozorro project was inspired 
by public procurement reforms in Georgia, with the experience of two e-procurement experts, 
guiding the development of an electronic procurement system for all Ukrainian public 
agencies6. This platform aims to hold the bidders and the public institutions that select the 
bidders accountable. But it also found a lot of obstacles on its way. As discussed earlier in the 
text, one the problems is the political opposition that reformist politicians and civil servants face 
when they try to approve the laws for implementation of new public procurement platform. 
The timeframe for this study begins with the establishment of the Prozorro platform and 
the last regional elections, from 2015 until 2017. Therefore the analysis includes 3 years of data. 
The parties that were selected for this analysis are the top 11 represented in the municipalities of 
Ukraine (according to the last regional elections).  
4.2.	  The	  variables	  considered	  in	  the	  statistical	  analysis	  
This project is based on statistical analysis of data on political parties and public 
procurement. Stemming from the theoretical and logical assumptions, it includes two sets of 
variables. The first one is a set of variables related to public procurement, which is also the 
dependent variable. Based on the information discussed during the interviews and the 
availability of data on the Prozorro website, four dependent variables are considered in this 
study: 1) The number of public procurement tenders published in Prozorro; 2) The number of 
signed contracts during the tender procedures; 3) The amount of money of the total sum of the 
tenders; and 4) The amount of savings of the tenders (when the expected value is higher than 
the final value). The data was retrieved from the Prozorro public procurement reform website 
for each municipality7. Not all municipalities announced the data with the municipality name8, 
which could have biased the data. Nevertheless, the available information online is a valid 
indication of how open the municipal councils are about announcing its procurement tenders.  
The second set of variables relates to the independent variable – the political 
representation. This variable refers to the number of deputies of each party in municipal 
councils, which is labeled with the name of the political party in the analysis. This information 
was retrieved from the website of National Elections Commission of Ukraine. I take into 
account the top 11 main represented parties (according to the National Elections Commission9) 
at the municipal level. The quantitative data on the number of representatives was 
complemented by other qualitative criteria on political parties for the second part of the analysis 
(section 5.2 Table 5 and Table 6): 
1. The Europeanization of the party (the salience of the EU in parties’ electoral 
programmes) – measured by a qualitative analysis of the mentions to words including 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  6	  Accessed on http://www.open-contracting.org/2016/07/28/prozorro-volunteer-project-led-nation-wide-
procurement-reform-ukraine/, accessed on 10 March 2017	  
7 The data on the public procurement procedures is available at the website http://bi.prozorro.org/, accessed on 27 
April 2017 
8 Some municipalities could have used a particular department name or a private individual name to announce their 
procurement tenders (Interview 2).	  
9 The data on the composition of each municipal council is available at 
http://www.cvk.gov.ua/pls/vm2015/PVM005?PT001F01=101&pt00_t001f01=100, accessed on 10 March 2017 
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EU and “Euro…” (Europeanization, Euro-integration, European, European Parliament, 
European member states etc.) in the political strategy documents.  
2. The qualification of anti-corruption party – measured by a qualitative analysis of the use 
of “anti-corruption” and “corruption” or “corrupted” in the political strategy document. 
3. The age of the party - from its official registration, accounting for the level of 
institutionalization of the party. 
In this section, the independent variable is clustered in groups of parties: pro-European, 
passive pro-European, anti-corruption and passive anti-corruption parties. This classification of 
political parties was done according to the Europeanization and anti-corruption parties theories. 
Meaning that parties who have mentioned the “corruption” or “anti-corruption” related words 
the most are labeled as the most anti-corruption parties (reference to the classification of the 
Table 1). In the same way, the parties that mentioned the words related to “European Union” 
the most are labeled as the most pro-European parties. Additionally, two variables of European 
majority plus anti-corruption majority are created for the second part of the analysis. In this 
way, the pro-EU cluster included the Solidarity, UKROP, Citizens, Motherland and Agrarian 
parties. The anti-corruption cluster included the Solidarity, UKROP and Motherland parties.  
Finally, to account for the possible bias in the numbers of open public procurement 
procedures three control variables are included in the analysis: the first two are the national 
allocated regional budget and the amount of population per municipality. These two variables 
are common to all of the parts of the analysis; they are used in the Table 4, Table 5 and Table 6. 
Low numbers of public procurement procedures can be explained by the economic conditions 
the population differences of the regions. This data was accessed from the official government 
documents for government budget and population of 2016. Unfortunately, the data on municipal 
budgets is not easily available at this moment but is in the process of becoming public.10 Lastly, 
a variable on geographical distribution of regions was created, accounting for East, Center and 
West of Ukraine. This variable is also used as a control interaction in the models of Table 5 and 
Table 6 to account for variation in the different regions of Ukraine.  
5.	  Results	  
The variables on public procurement, the variables of political parties and two control 
variables were considered for the first part of the analysis. The descriptive statistics are 
presented as follows:  
Table 2 – Descriptive statistics 
Variables N Mean St. Dev. Min Max 
Total Votes 460 15,616.1 8,707.0 2,876 68,022 
Total Seats 460 32.7 4.3 22 50 
Opposition Block Party 460 3.0 4.0 0 25 
Solidarity Party 460 7.3 2.9 0 23 
Our Country Party 460 2.1 3.2 0 17 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  10	  The concept of “Open Budget” was approved by the Cabinet of Ministers on 11/01/2016, and envisions a start 
of a pilot e-budget platform, which will announce the state and regional budget details by 2018. The tool started 
working in August 2017 but is still under development and lacks significant amounts and categories of data. The x 
z z         website can be accessed at http://spending.gov.ua/ and http://openbudget.in.ua/	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Motherland Party 460 5.5 2.7 0 20 
Agrarian Party 460 2.5 3.5 0 17 
Rebirth Party 460 1.4 2.9 0 16 
UKROP Party 460 1.7 2.1 0 10 
Freedom Party 460 1.3 2.0 0 10 
Self-Help Party 460 0.5 1.3 0 8 
Radical Party 460 2.5 2.1 0 12 
Citizen’s Position Party 460 0.5 1.6 0 13 
Sum Seats Main Parties 460 28.5 6.0 7 50 
Seats Other Parties 460 4.5 4.8 0 27 
Tenders 460 3.0 4.8 0 46 
Total sum (money) tenders 460 473,753.2 2,141,826.0 0 42,972,290 
Savings of tenders 460 5.599.0 55,424.9 -120,000 909,877 
Number contracts 460 2.3 3.9 0 43 
Economy 460 2,808,580.0 987,246.1 1,260,064 5,316,937 
Population 460 40,030.8 23,453.3 5,761 182,067 
 
As the table 2 shows, 460 municipalities were considered in this study. Some of them 
are missing due to the fact that the illegal annexation of Crimea as well as the war in Donbas 
and Luhansk regions did not allow for fully conducting the regional elections. The maximum 
amount of tenders per municipality is 46, and the minimum is 0. The total sum of money that 
the tenders involved varies from maximum 42,971,290 hryvnas (around 2 million dollars) to 0 
(473,753 as a mean). There were generally 2,3 contracts signed amongst the municipalities, 
meaning that the competition was not so significant (the mean of 3 tenders and 2,3 contracts 
signed is not enough to be a solid procurement competition).  
5.1.	  The	  analysis	  of	  impact	  of	  individual	  political	  parties	  on	  tenders	  
The OLS analysis of the data showed the following results: 
Table 3 – OLS regressions with 4 models for individual parties 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Intercept -2.24 
(2.01) 
-748,052.10 
(928,897.10) 
12,663.71 
(22,786.49) 
-2.17 
(1.64) 
Opposition Block 
Party 
0.06 
(0.09) 
22,873.33 
(41,951.08) 
-2,085.36** 
(1,029.08) 
0.05 
(0.07) 
Solidarity Party 0.15 
(0.09) 
43,192.35 
(43,146.15) 
-1,455.66 
(1,058.40) 
0.15** 
(0.07) 
Our Country Party 0.08 
(0.10) 
17,571.51 
(48,114.35) 
-254.52 
(1,180.27) 
0.09 
(0.08) 
Motherland Party -0.04 
(0.10) 
17,096.46 
(50,049.47) 
-677.32 
(1,227.74) 
-0.04 
(0.09) 
Agrarian Party 0.17** 
(0.08) 
39,917.56 
(40,287.55) 
-234.73 
(988.28) 
0.11 
(0.07) 
Rebirth Party 0.17 
(0.11) 
16,275.61 
(53,637.55) 
3,008.04** 
(1,315.76) 
0.18* 
(0.09) 
UROP Party 0.29** 
(0.13) 
46,071.84 
(59,002.16) 
878.10 
(1,447.36) 
0.21** 
(0.10) 
Freedom Party -0.09 
(0.14) 
-43,404.68 
(67,614.13) 
-2,662.70 
(1,658.62) 
-0.05 
(0.12) 
Self-help Party -0.33 
(0.21) 
-83,034.85 
(96,083.35) 
535.80 
(2,356.99) 
-0.23 
(0.17) 
Radical Party  0.23* 
(0.12) 
56,711.27 
(56,978.55) 
-616.15 
(1,397.72) 
0.21** 
(0.10) 
Citizens’ Position  0.01 6,793.55 -838.12 0.00 
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(0.16) (75,978.31) (1,863.80) (0.13) 
Other Parties 0.04 
(0.08) 
149.88 
(38,504.55) 
-1,474.74 
(944.54) 
0.06 
(0.07) 
Economy 0.00 
(0.00) 
0.01 
(0.125) 
-0.00 
(0.00) 
0.00 
(0.00) 
Population 0.00** 
(0.00) 
10.20* 
(5.96) 
0.71*** 
(0.14) 
0.00** 
(0.00) 
Observations 460 460 460 460 
R2 0.08 0.02 0.12 0.08 
Adjusted R2 0.05 -0.00 0.10 0.05 
Residual Std. Error 
(df=445) 
4.65 2,146,154.00 52,646.65 3.803 
F Statistic (df=14; 
445) 
2.916*** 0.87 4.55*** 2.805*** 
Notes: Model 1 based on number of tenders, Model 2 based on total sum (money) of tenders, Model 3 
based on savings of tenders (expected value>final value) and Model 4 based on number of contracts. 
 
According to the data of the analysis, significant results in the first model11 correspond 
to the Agrarian, UKROP and Radical parties. UKROP has highest significance and in fact it is 
the party with highest pro-European and anti-corruption rankings. Both Agrarian and Radical 
parties have moderate pro-European and anti-corruption rankings. The second model shows 
significance only for the control variables. The third model shows significance for Opposition 
Block party, where it shows that when the presence of this party increases, the economy of the 
tenders decreases. This party is an anti-EU and not anti-corruption party, and thus it makes 
sense according to the theory that when its presence increases – the savings of the public 
tenders decrease. However, some controversial results appear with the significance of the 
Rebirth party in this model, because it shows that when the party is present the economy of the 
tenders increases. Solidarity, Rebirth, Radical and UKROP parties have significance in the last 
model. It means that when these parties are present in the municipal council – more contracts 
are signed, and therefore there is more competition. This is one of the major signs of fair public 
procurement tenders. Once again, Solidarity and UKROP parties have highest scores for pro-
European and anti-corruption indicators. Rebirth party shows significance but has no level of 
Europeanization and low level of anti-corruption. Radical party has regular levels for both 
criteria. These results are supported by the crosscheck in the data: when there are biggest 
numbers of public tenders, there is mostly a majority of Solidarity party or Rebirth and Agrarian 
parties.  
With regards to the age of the parties, Solidarity, Rebirth and Agrarian parties are the 
only cases where the institutionalization hypothesis can be applied. It would, in fact, justify the 
significance for Rebirth and Agrarian parties because they have neither special Europeanization 
nor anti-corruption levels. Additionally, it potentiates the explanation of the Solidarity 
significance. In sum, after analyzing the results of the first statistical analysis it can be argued 
that all of the hypotheses were confirmed. As expected, the highest anti-corruption and 
Europeanization parties such as Solidarity and UKROP showed significant results. Accordingly, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  11	  The assumption checks of this and other models were done in R. Both multicollinearity and residual checks 
showed normal results with no particular deviations. They can be replicated with the R code provided upon request 
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Agrarian and Rebirth parties’ significance explains the hypothesis of the institutionalization of 
the parties.  
5.2.	  The	  impact	  of	  clustered	  groups	  of	  political	  parties	  mediated	  by	  the	  regional	  
categories	  variable	  
After considering the results of the previous analysis, a parallel analysis was conducted 
at a different level. First of all, some of the variables had many missing values12, which could 
have created confusion when using them in the model. Additionally, the approach to analyzing 
the impact of political parties was reconsidered. The pro-European parties were clustered in one 
group, as well as the anti-corruption parties and their opposites. A variable for majority of these 
parties was included. To account for geographical distribution, a new variable “regional 
categories” (East, Center and West) was added to the analysis as a control variable. This gave 
an indication of which party has a majority in which region: 
Table 4 – Most represented parties in the geographical division of Ukraine 
Party Central Ukraine Eastern Ukraine Western Ukraine 
Agrarian Party 27 5 4 
Citizens Position Party 0 1 1 
Freedom Party 0 0 3 
Motherland Party 33 6 21 
Radical Party 10 0 1 
Opposition Block Party 1 51 10 
Other Parties 15 11 6 
Our Country Party 10 8 4 
Rebirth Party 2 12 4 
Samopomich Party 0 0 1 
Solidarity Party 102 46 62 
UKROP Party 1 1 1 
Note: light blue shading for the parties that score low in both European and 
anti-corruption categories 
Table 4 demonstrates that there is a relation between anti-corruption/ pro-European 
parties and the geographical division of Ukraine. The parties that scored 0 or low (for the pro-
European and anti-corruption indicators) are generally represented as majority in Eastern 
Ukraine. What is more, the highest pro-European and anti-corruption parties are mostly 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  12	  The variable on savings of the tenders has very few observations and can create confusion when there is no 
saving because there was no data or there was data but no saving (423 zeros out of 460 observations).  
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represented in central and Western Ukraine. This can be explained with the proximity to Russia 
or Europe and the on-going conflict in the East. Therefore, this variable is included in the 
following models. 
5.2.1.	  The	  impact	  of	  clusters	  of	  anti-­‐corruption	  parties	  on	  public	  tenders	  
The cluster of anti-corruption parties and anti-corruption majority showed the following 
results: 
Table 5 – OLS results for anti-corruption clusters of parties 
 Model 1 
(Tenders) 
Model 2 
 
Model 3 
(Money) 
Model 4  
 
Model 5 
(Contracts) 
Model 6 
Intercept -1.08 
(1.47) 
0.28 
(0.77) 
-517185.31 
(668698.96) 
-22028.87 
(346607.98) 
-0.57 
(1.20) 
0.16 
(0.62) 
Anti-Corruption 
parties (Top)  
3.99 
(2.71) 
 1660159.13 
(1231521.27) 
 2.25 
(2.21) 
 
Anti-Corruption 
majority  
 1.43* 
(0.71) 
 818542.54 * 
(321509.71) 
 0.88 
(0.58) 
Region East 2.24 
(1.92) 
0.10 
(0.60) 
513699.26 
(870461.18) 
-19943.91 
(270954.51) 
1.21 
(1.56) 
0.09 
(0.49) 
Region West 1.04 
(1.89) 
-1.31 
(0.72) 
620922.58 
(858178.32) 
-231646.85 
(323759.16) 
-0.00 
(1.54) 
-1.28* 
(0.58) 
Population 0.00*** 
(0.00) 
0.00*** 
(0.00) 
11.17* 
(4.72) 
10.84* 
(4.70) 
0.00*** 
(0.00) 
0.00*** 
(0.00) 
Economy 0.00* 
(0.00) 
0.00* 
(0.00) 
-0.00 
(0.11) 
0.00 
(0.11) 
0.00 
(0.00) 
0.00 
(0.00) 
Anti-Corruption 
(Majority)* East 
-6.22 
(4.38) 
-2.38 
(1.32) 
-1753802.84 
(1986784.78) 
-891774.65 
(598669.18) 
-3.38 
(3.57) 
-1.45 
(1.08) 
Anti-Corruption 
(Majority)* West 
-5.67 
(3.90) 
-0.75 
(1.18) 
-2391687.21 
(1771121.85) 
-738321.44 
(532490.38) 
-3.08 
(3.18) 
-0.42 
(0.96) 
Observations 460 460 460 460 460 460 
R2 0.05 0.05 0.02 0.03 0.05 0.05 
Adjusted R2 0.03 0.04 0.01 0.02 0.04 0.04 
Res. Standard Error 
(df=452) 
4.71  4.69  2134757 
 
2124532 
 
3.84  3.83  
 
F Statistics 
(df=7;452) 
3.29*** 3.64*** 1.43 2.07* 3.42*** 
 
3.68*** 
 
Note: Model 1 and 2 based on number of tenders; Model 3 and 4 based on total sum of money; Model 5 and 6 
based on number of contracts; Models 2,4 and 6 based on the independent variable of “Anti-corruption 
majority”. Models 1,3 and 5 based on the independent variable of “Anti-corruption parties”.  
Anti-Corruption cluster: Solidarity, UKROP and Motherland parties.  
           What this model shows is that an anti-corruption majority in the municipalities does 
influence the public procurement: it increases the number of tenders by 1.43 and the total sum 
of money by 818 thousand. Additionally, the interaction of anti-corruption majority and the 
regions shows significance in the Western region (Model 6) but not in the expected direction: 
anti-corruption majority in the West reduces the number of contracts to 0.46, while it is 0.88 in 
the central and even smaller in the East. The variables of economy and population of the 
municipalities show significance in most of the models, meaning that the population and 
economic indicator of the region influence public procurement of the municipal councils (which 
usually corresponds to communal expenses) in a positive direction (the bigger the population, 
the more tenders). These results are in line with the actual data, where the municipalities with 
the highest amount of tenders have an anti-corruption parties majority, mainly with Solidarity 
Party as most represented one (see Annex 1.3 last paragraph for more details). 
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5.2.2.	  The	  impact	  of	  clusters	  of	  pro-­‐European	  parties	  on	  public	  tenders	  
The pro-European parties showed the following results: 
Table 6 – OLS results for pro-European clusters of parties 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4  Model 5 Model 6 
Intercept -1.39 
(1.61) 
-0.00 
(0.87) 
-630051.29 
(731929.36) 
-52323.09 
(392834.88) 
-0.33 
(1.31) 
0.11 
(0.71) 
Pro-European 
Parties  
3.67 
(2.43) 
 1508551.28 
(1104859.11) 
 1.36 
(1.98) 
 
Pro-European 
Majority 
 1.24 
(0.69) 
 468741.12 
(315535.49) 
 0.58 
(0.57) 
Region East 3.06 
(2.18) 
0.50 
(0.74) 
554659.90 
(991513.75) 
7594.38 
(334007.69) 
1.76 
(1.78) 
0.28 
(0.60) 
Region West 0.01 
(2.03) 
-0.84 
(0.92) 
545682.07 
(921378.80) 
-116227.80 
(417573.98) 
-0.90 
(1.66) 
-1.18 
(0.75) 
Population 0.00*** 
(0.00) 
0.00*** 
(0.00) 
11.44* 
(4.72) 
11.34* 
(4.73) 
0.00*** 
(0.00) 
0.00*** 
(0.00) 
Economy 0.00* 
(0.00) 
0.00 
(0.00) 
-0.01 
(0.11) 
-0.01 
(0.11) 
0.00 
(0.00) 
0.00 
(0.00) 
Pro-European 
(Majority)* East 
-6.81 
(4.24) 
-1.92 
(1.13) 
-1446394.95 
(1926547.38) 
-451335.88 
(511801.25) 
-4.10 
(3.46) 
-1.21 
(0.92) 
Pro-European 
(Majority)* West 
-2.65 
(3.44) 
-1.09 
(1.12) 
-1793386.86 
(1563451.34) 
-572022.28 
(509653.56) 
-0.86 
(2.81) 
-0.35 
(0.92) 
Observations 460 460 460 460 460 460 
R2 0.04 0.05 0.02 0.02 0.05 0.05 
Adjusted R2 0.03 0.04 0.01 0.01 0.04 0.04 
Res. Standard Error 
(df=452) 
4.7  4.7  2135273 
 
2134469 
 
3.84  3.83  
 
F Statistics 
(df=7; 452) 
3.34*** 3.42*** 1.40 1.45 3.45*** 
 
3.51*** 
 
Note: Model 1 and 2 based on number of tenders; Model 3 and 4 based on total sum of money; Model 5 and 6 
based on number of contracts; Models 2, 4 and 6 based on the independent variable of “Pro-European 
Majority”. Models 1,3 and 5 based on the independent variable of “Pro-European parties”. 
Pro-EU cluster: Solidarity, UKROP, Citizens, Motherland and Agrarian Parties.  
When compared to the previous results, this table does not show any relevant 
significance apart of the control variables. The coefficients, however, are in the expected 
direction. But the interactions of Pro-European parties / Pro-European majority and the regional 
variable are negative for both the East and the West. These results seem incongruent with the 
theories. Yet, in the West the coefficients are less negative than in the East, which aligns with 
the idea that the West is more open to public procurement. 
In sum, including the clustered anti-corruption and pro-European parties showed some 
significant results. It showed significance for anti-corruption majority in the model of total sum 
of tenders (Table 5, Model 6). Thus, results of clustered models can be interpreted as expected: 
the pro-European and anti-corruption parties seem to foster the public procurement procedures. 
This can be researched further with additional information on public tenders with different 
clusters of political parties or with individual parties because there is no such a concept as 
“coalition” in Ukraine. In reality parties in Ukraine usually work alone and are not known for 
creating coalitions to fight for a common purpose such as the example of promoting anti-
corruption.  
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6.	  Conclusions	  and	  Discussion	  
This research evaluated the possibility of political parties to influence anti-corruption 
reforms in Ukraine based on their electoral commitments and the actual implementation. It 
found in the first part of the analysis that some individual parties - which rank high on anti-
corruption, Europeanization and are highly institutionalized - can influence the anti-corruption 
reform in Ukraine. As expected, political parties in Ukraine do not align with the theories of 
anti-elite rhetoric of European states, since the ones who emphasize anti-corruption more are 
the older, centre-positioned parties that are in power. Additionally, parties with high EU 
rhetoric are the ones who have higher rhetoric on anti-corruption. Therefore, the three theories 
of institutionalization, Europeanization and anti-corruption parties seem to apply in the findings 
of this research. 
In the second part of the analysis this research found that the anti-corruption parties have 
a significant impact on public procurement of Ukraine not only individually but also when there 
is an anti-corruption majority in the municipal council. Anti-corruption coalitions appear to be 
stronger than the pro-European parties coalition, probably because anti-corruption has a more 
direct link to integrity in procurement than being pro-European. It also proved that the promises 
of political parties to fight corruption are put into practice with public procurement in most of 
the expected cases. In addition to this, the variable on regional categories showed that in the 
West there is more promotion of anti-corruption reforms than in the East. This has been 
confirmed with a crosscheck of the data proving that the municipalities with most tenders are 
the ones who have a majority of pro-European and anti-corruption parties (see last paragraph of 
the Annex 1.3).  
In his study, Bagenholm (2013) compared the corruption levels of CPI and NIT of 
several post-Communist states and the presence of anti-corruption political parties in power 
during that time and he found out that some parties failed to deliver anti-corruption promises 
because the corruption levels in the country increased. The same is happening in Ukraine – 
parties promise to deliver anti-corruption reforms, but the country keeps getting higher 
indicators of corruption. Corruption rose to unprecedented levels in particular after the 
Euromaidan. The only explanation to this phenomenon is that anti-corruption reform cannot 
deliver fruitful results in a limited period of time. While this could explain why anti-corruption 
parties that are in government did not deliver what they promised during the electoral campaign, 
it can also be argued that the country needs more time to re-structure its governance and 
cultivate a new culture of integrity within the population in general and within the elites that 
govern the country.  
Ukraine faces a constant fight within its own society and institutions: the fight to 
become a “European” state not by agreements, but on values. One of the main steps to do so is 
to promote integrity in all spheres of governance. While anti-corruption is popular in Ukraine, it 
will take time for the governance of the country to realize the importance of promoting integrity 
in civil service and governance by monitoring of public institutions, understanding how to do 
reforms and creating the capacity to do it. Bagenholm (2013; 178) argues that anti-corruption 
relates to “credibility, morality, ethics, honesty, and transparency”, not about how to make 
policies. This is something that politicians and civil servants in Ukraine have to realize – 
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pursuing the best practices of anti-corruption without educating the ones who govern the 
country to act morally, based on ethics and transparency is not an effective strategy. In order to 
promote public procurement reform, politicians and civil servants have to be educated and 
trained to promote integrity in government.  
Overall, the results of this study on public procurement reform are an indication that 
Ukraine is on its path to integrity and good governance. However, much remains to be done and 
effective monitoring of reforms such as the public procurement is needed. For this reason, 
studies of data on public tenders should become a must. They should encompass more criteria 
of the public tenders and serve to elaborate effective measures to analyze and prevent 
corruption in public procurement. Citizens as principals of their agents (the politicians) should 
also play the leading role in this process and monitor the effectiveness of decentralization of 
Ukrainian governance through the available data on the public procurement reform. In this 
regard, the education and awareness within the population is a crucial tool to achieve these 
results. Another recommendation is to provide the civil servants and political representatives of 
the municipalities with the necessary technical knowledge to implement fair and open public 
procurement procedures. International donors and regional organizations such as the OECD and 
the EU should focus on such recommendations.  
In conclusion, this research demonstrates that the influence of political parties on 
reforms in Ukraine is underestimated and that public procurement reform needs constant 
research and evaluation to avoid corruption. For this reason it is crucial to understand what the 
pitfalls of decentralization of governance are and how to address them. Since this paper is the 
first to research the influence of anti-corruption and pro-European political parties on the 
quality of governance reforms in Ukraine, it contributes to the literature on this topic. It also 
reveals multiple questions that are to be answered in the future studies. The role of anti-
corruption, pro-European and institutionalized parties should be studied further with similar 
case studies and additional data on public procurement or other anti-corruption reform. 
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Annex	  1	  
1.	  Decentralization	  –	  local	  governance	  of	  Ukraine	  
In the Constitution of Ukraine, the “Territorial Structure of Ukraine” is established in 
the Chapter IX. The Article 132 specifies that Ukraine be based on the principles of unity and 
indivisibility of the state territory, with combination of centralization and decentralization in the 
exercise of state power. The Article 133 defines the system of administrative and territorial 
structure of Ukraine as composed by the Autonomous Republic of Crimea, oblasts, districts, 
cities, city districts, settlements and villages. Ukraine is composed of the Autonomous Republic 
of Crimea, Vinnytsia Oblast, Volyn Oblast, Dnipropetrovsk Oblast, Donetsk Oblast, Zhytomyr 
Oblast, Zakarpattia Oblast, Zaporizhia Oblast, Ivano-Frankivsk Oblast, Kyiv Oblast, 
Kirovohrad Oblast, Luhansk Oblast, Lviv Oblast, Mykolayiv Oblast, Odesa Oblast, Poltava 
Oblast, Rivne Oblast, Sumy Oblast, Ternopil Oblast, Kharkiv Oblast, Kherson Oblast, 
Khmelnytskyi Oblast, Cherkasy Oblast, Chernivtsi Oblast and Chernihiv Oblast, and the Cities 
of Kyiv and Sevastopol. The Cities of Kyiv and Sevastopol have special status, which is 
determined by the laws of Ukraine.  
As Figure 1 indicates, the hierarchy of the public decision-making is complex. At the 
top of the hierarchy is the central government of Ukraine, composed by the President, the 
Parliament and the Cabinet of Ministers. The President is the one who appoints the heads of 
local state administrations. The major of the city, village or town is elected by the respective 
territorial community, on the basis of universal, equal and direct suffrage by secret ballot for 
four years in a manner prescribed by law, and exercises its powers on a permanent basis. 
Village, town or city mayor heads the executive committee of the village, town or city council 
and presides over its meetings. Therefore, the village, town or city council is accountable to the 
major. 
Local State Administrations are the main executive powers in the regions and districts of 
Ukraine (Law on Local State Administrations, 1999)13. They are responsible for the control and 
implementation at the local level of the Constitution, laws of Ukraine, acts of the President of 
Ukraine, the Cabinet of Ministers and other high level executive powers. The Local State 
Administration coordinates local executive authorities with regards to tax, architecture, 
construction, environmental inspection and police functions. The quality of education is also 
controlled by the local state administrations. If the Local State Administration notices some 
discrepancies in the work of the regional authorities, it has a duty to report to the central 
government. In this regard, they are dependent on the decision taken at the highest level of 
Ukrainian governance, and thus have limited capacity of taking their own decision and have to 
comply/implement the decision of the central government.  
Village, town and city councils are local governments representing respective 
municipalities and carry out on their behalf and in their interest functions and powers of local 
government by the Constitution of Ukraine, and other laws. Regional and district councils are 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  13	  Information	  available	  at	  http://zakon2.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/586-­‐14.	  The	  Law	  on	  Local	  State	  Administrations	  dates	  1999,	  but	  was	  last	  amended	  on	  14	  March	  2017.	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local governments that represent the common interests of territorial communities of villages, 
towns, cities within the powers defined by the Constitution and other laws of Ukraine and 
powers assigned to them by village, settlement and city councils. The chapter XI of the 
Constitution of Ukraine focuses on the “Local Self-Government”. It specifies that district 
(municipality) and oblast councils represent the common interests of territorial communities of 
villages, settlements and cities. The Article 142 specifies the budgeting of the local authorities, 
while the Article 143 defines how it should be spent: 
Article 143 - Oblast and district councils approve programmes for socio-economic and 
cultural development of the respective oblasts and districts, and control their implementation; 
approve district and oblast budgets that are formed from the funds of the state budget for their 
appropriate distribution among territorial communities or for the implementation of joint 
projects, and from the funds drawn on the basis of agreement from local budgets for the 
realization of joint socio-economic and cultural programmes, and control their implementation; 
resolve other issues ascribed to their competence by law. 
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2.	  Integrity	  Risks	  in	  Public	  Procurement	  
Bribery of public officials is not easy to research since these types of transactions are 
not made public unless investigated and prosecuted. Nevertheless, corruption in public 
procurement can be measured while considering different criteria on public procurement 
procedures. Studies of public procurement established have criteria for fair public tenders and 
have widely described the risks associated with the process. For example, the OECD defines 
several risks of public procurement procedures, such as: influence of external actors on public 
official decisions, informal agreements, use and abuse of non-competitive procedures, not 
objective selection criteria, conflict of interests during the evaluation process, undisclosed 
selection information among others, as showed in the figure below.	  
	  Figure	  1	  –	  Integrity	  risks	  in	  the	  procurement	  process	  	  
Note: Figure available at OECD 2016 “Corruption in Public Procurement”  
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3.	  Additional	  observations	  of	  the	  data	  
Collection of public procurement data: the data on procurement procedures was 
collected from the publicly available website of the procurement reform “Prozorro”. The 
number of public tenders was complemented with the amount of money of the tenders. During 
the first try, the total sum of the tenders was also complemented with the savings. Some (very 
few) tenders’ expected value was higher than the final value. But this happened in less than 7% 
of the cases – more specifically in 32 cases out of 463. It is worth noticing that the amounts are 
not very high, which gives the impression that the municipal councils are not very used to using 
the platform for open public procurement.  
Additionally, an observation was made about the number of “open” tenders. Most of the 
tenders were contracted ones, meaning that the municipality has already agreed on the 
contracting amount of money with the bidder and then announced it in the Prozorro system. 
This, in fact, is a signal of underdeveloped procurement system in Ukraine. Additionally, there 
are many missing values for many of the regions. But a particularly high number of gaps in 
information was noticed in the Mykolayivska Obl., Zhytomyrska Obl. and Odesska Obl. This 
creates an impression that in some regions the municipal councils are not sufficiently open. 
In most of the cases when there was data missing for the municipal councils - the city 
council, the regional governmental council, or the village council had some public tenders. 
However, in some cases only the public institutions (like hospitals) had public tenders in a 
specific region. This can be explained by the fact that in some regions the municipal council 
does not play the same role as the city council or the local state administration. This can depend 
on the fact that in one municipality’s major is more open/reformist than in another municipality. 
When there is data for local state administrations but not for the municipality council it makes 
an impression that the reforms are promoted more from the central government than from the 
decentralized municipal councils. This is why further research should compare the 
accountability of different levels of regional governance in Ukraine.  
Additional observations on the data: the analysis includes 1405 procedures of 460 
municipal councils. 20% of the tenders were cancelled (281 procedures). There is 90% of cases 
where the contracts were just signed as a single contract. Most of them did not have an open 
procedure. Almost 95% of the cases had same expected and final value; thus, no savings were 
made with the purchase. The region that has less procurement tenders in Prozorro is 
Mykolayivska Obl. Hadiatska municipality has 46 tenders, where there is a majority of 
Solidarity deputies. Chechelnytska municipality has 26 tenders, where the most represented 
party is Solidarity. Berehivska municipality has 27 tenders with a majority of other (not top 11) 
parties. Koziatynska municipality has 28 tenders with the equal number of Solidarity, Agrarian 
and Motherland parties representatives. Prylutska has 27 tenders with a majority of Solidarity 
representatives. Kaevo-Sviatoshynska municipality has 19 tenders with mostly Solidarity 
representatives. Therefore, one can assume that there is a pattern with regards to the 
representation of anti-corruption and pro-European parties with the biggest amount of tenders.  
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